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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
GLENDA BETH SMUIN, : Case No. 950477-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals her conviction for production of a controlled substance 
(marijuana), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 1995). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Is the search warrant affidavit inadequate to establish probable 
cause based on a) a claimed material omission and b) stale information? 
Defendant's allegation of a material omission was affirmatively waived 
below and should not be considered. State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) 
("some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial 
court record before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal"). Accord State 
v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). Consequently, her attempt to raise the 
issue on appeal may constitute invited error. See State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220-21 
(Utah 1993) (invited error doctrine precludes a party from taking advantage of a claimed 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error). 
To the extent defendant claims the affidavit was unintentionally deficient 
because it failed to state the primary suspect's address and also set forth stale information, 
a magistrate's probable cause determination is given great deference on review. Illinois 
v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Indeed, the reviewing court is not required to 
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's probable cause determination, but need only 
determine whether the supporting affidavit provided a "substantial basis" for that 
determination. State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991). Accord United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897. 915 (1984). Particularly 
considering a staleness challenge, the reviewing court need only determine whether 
despite the passage of time there remained a fair probability of finding evidence on the 
premises to be searched. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993). 
Accordingly, consistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for warrant 
supported searches, the reviewing court does not engage in a hypertechnical, but rather a 
common sense evaluation of the probable cause ruling. ]<&. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 
2 
and United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)). The resolution of doubtful or 
marginal cases should therefore be determined in accord with this preference. LI 
2. Is the search warrant affidavit sufficient to establish a) probable 
cause to believe the contraband was unlawfully acquired or possessed, or evidenced 
illegal conduct and b) was the affidavit required to demonstrate that the contraband 
was not obtainable by subpoena? 
These issues are raised for the first time on appeal and should not be 
considered on grounds of waiver. Johnson. 774 P.2d at 114; Brown 856 P.2d at 359. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with producing marijuana, a third degree felony, 
and possessing marijuana and paraphernalia, both class B misdemeanors (R. 4-2).l 
1
 The record is numbered in reverse chronological order. 
3 
Defendant joined codefendant Ferrell Smuin's motion to suppress evidence 
seized pursuant to a warrant supported search (R. 205).2 
Following a suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 299). 
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the third degree felony charge of 
producing a controlled substance (R. 226-17) and the remaining misdemeanor counts 
were dismissed (R. 304). 
The trial court imposed a zero-to-five year term, which term was suspended 
and defendant was placed on probation (R. 235-32). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The critical facts are set forth in the search warrant affidavit (R. 22-19) (a 
copy is contained in addendum A). The affidavit was submitted by Deputy Uintah 
County Sheriff, Vance Norton, in support of a search warrant for defendant's residence to 
look for illegal antiquities including human skeletal remains and other burial artifacts 
(idL). Although the primary suspect, Dallas Rowley, was not alleged to reside at 
defendant's residence, he was alleged to have stored at least one ancient human skull 
there: 
On Tuesday, January 17,1995, [Deputy Norton] spoke 
with Don Jacobs who was then at the residence of his 
ex-wife, Linda Jacobs. Don Jacobs told [Deputy 
Norton] that he then saw a large bone which he 
2
 No formal motion to suppress is included in the record on appeal in this 
case. 
4 
believed to be a dinosaur bone in Linda Jacobs' 
residence. [Deputy Norton] also heard Don Jacobs' 
daughter, Crystal Jacobs, tell Don Jacobs that she had 
seen a human skull. Don Jacobs then told [Deputy 
Norton] that Linda Jacobs' boyfriend, Dallas Rowley, 
currently possessed an American Indian human skull. 
On Friday, January 20,1995, Detective Wayne 
Hollebeke and [Deputy Norton] interviewed Crystal 
Jacobs. Crystal Jacobs is eight hears old. Crystal 
Jacobs told [Deputy Norton] that she had been shown a 
human skull at [defendant's] house by Dallas Rowley. 
She described the house as being a trailer on the comer 
up from her house and as having many junk cars in 
front. Crystal said that the skull was brought in the 
main room and placed on to the top of the television, 
then it was repackaged and put away. She said that 
this occurred in the past several weeks. She told 
[Deputy Norton] that she had been told that the skulls 
were dug up by Dallas Rowley when he was hunting 
and trapping. 
[Deputy Norton] drove to 3975 South Vernal Avenue, 
Vernal, Utah and saw a residence consisting of two 
trailer homes joined under a single roof. There were 
several junk cars immediately outside the residence. 
The residence is visible from the Linda Jacobs' 
residence, just up the street and on the comer. It is in 
all respects consistent with the description given by 
Crystal Jacobs. 
Don Jacobs told [the deputy] that he saw animal pelts 
at Linda Jacobs' residence that he believed were 
illegally taken by Dallas Rowley. [Deputy Norton] 
learned from A.P. & P. Special Agent Jim Murray that 
Dallas Rowley is a professional hunter and is on 
probation. He was previously charged with numerous 
weapons violations as well as illegally taking big game 
5 
in Colorado. [Deputy Norton was not able to] 
determine the disposition of these charges. 
On January 20, 1995, [Deputy Norton] spoke with 
Mrs. Beverly Jacobs who told me that her 
granddaughter, Kathy Jacobs, another daughter of 
Linda and Don Jacobs, told her not long ago that she 
had seen human skulls shown to her by Dallas Rowley. 
04). 
Following Deputy Norton's conversation with Beverly Jacobs on January 
20, 1995, he sought and obtained a warrant to search for skull and other ancient burial 
artifacts at defendant's residence (R. 18-16), s££ addendum A. Upon entering the house, 
investigating officers observed 19 marijuana plants growing in defendant's kitchen (R. 
I).3 Additional marijuana, marijuana seeds and drug paraphernalia were found in 
defendant's bedroom (id). 
As noted previously, defendant joined in codefendant's motion to suppress 
the evidence seized (R. 205), however, a copy of that motion to suppress has not been 
included in the record on appeal in this case. Following a hearing on the matter, 
\ 
codefendant argued that there was insufficient connection between the premises searched 
and Rowley's sought for antiquities because the affidavit did not allege that Rowley 
resided with the defendants' (R. 268-69). 
3
 Because the logistics of the search were not discussed at the suppression 
hearing, the State cites the probable cause statement of the charging information for these 
facts. 
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Defendant argued that the information contained in the affidavit was stale 
because Crystal Jacobs reported having seen the skull at the defendants' residence several 
weeks ago (R. 269). Defendant further asserted that although the affidavit contained no 
false information (R. 270-72), and that Deputy Norton had not intentionally 
misrepresented any information (R. 277), the affidavit could be read to suggest that 
Rowley resided with the defendants (R. 270-72). This reading was possible, claimed 
defendant, because the warrant heading named only Rowley (R. 270), and because the 
affidavit alleged that antiquities belonged to Rowley (R. 271). 
Alternatively, defendant argued that because there was no express 
allegation that Rowley in fact resided with the defendants, there was an insufficient basis 
to believe that the skull would still be at the defendants' residence approximately three 
weeks after Crystal Jacobs reported having seen it there (R. 272, 274). 
Finally, defendant argued that the alleged stale information, together with 
the fact that the affidavit did not affirmatively state that Deputy Norton knew that Rowley 
lived with Linda Jacobs and not with the defendants indicated bad faith on the part of the 
deputy (R. 273-78,281). 
Ruling from the bench immediately following the parties arguments, the 
trial court denied the motion to suppress (R. 299) (the pertinent transcript pages are 
attached as addendum B). The trial court rejected defendant's suggestion that the 
affidavit could reasonably be read to suggest that Rowley resided with defendant (R. 270-
7 
71,279-80, 297), sge addendum B. Rather, the trial court found that the affidavit was 
clear as to the facts that the suspected contraband had been observed both at Linda 
Jacobs' residence and at defendants' residence (R. 280,297), SS£ addendum B. The trial 
court further rejected defendant's claim that the deputy's failure to allege in the affidavit 
where Rowley lived constituted false information and/or evidenced bad faith (R. 272, 
276,297-98), S££ addendum B. The trial court credited Deputy Norton's testimony that 
he told the magistrate that Rowley did not in fact live at defendant's house before the 
magistrate authorized the warrant (R. 277, 287, 298), see addendum B. 
Additionally, the trial court found that there was a "definite connection" 
between defendant's residence and Crystal Jacobs' observation of the skull (R. 269), see 
addendum B. Specifically, the trial court determined that Crystal's use of the descriptive 
terms "repackaged and put away" reasonably suggested that the skull was being stored or 
kept at defendant's residence (R. 280-86,298), sge addendum B, and that the skull was 
not the type of item likely to be kept on Rowley's person (R. 298), S££ addendum B. 
Finally, the trial court noted that it was irrelevant to the probable cause determination 
whether the skull was ultimately recovered from the defendants' residence (R. 286), see 
addendum B. 
No written findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for determining that there was current probable cause to search defendant's house. 
Defendant's claims of intentional falsity or other material omission in the search warrant 
affidavit were withdrawn at the suppression hearing and may constitute invited error on 
appeal. 
Defendant's claims, that the affidavit failed to establish that Rowley 
illegally possessed antiquities and further failed to indicate that the skull could not have 
been obtained by subpoena, are raised for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, these 
claims are waived and should not be considered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT SET 
FORTH MATERIAL AND CURRENT FACTS 
PROVIDING A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE 
MAGISTRATE'S PROBABLE CAUSE 
DETERMINATION 
In Points I-II, defendant claims that the search warrant affidavit omitted 
material information regarding Rowley's residence and also set forth stale information 
concerning the most recent citing of the suspected illegal skull at defendant's house. Br. 
of Aplt. at 4-9. To the extent that defendant's claims are properly before the Court, they 
lack merit and should be rejected. 
9 
Franks/Nielsen Standard 
Defendant first claims that the search warrant affidavit omitted relevant 
information that Deputy Norton knew that Rowley did not reside with defendant. Br. of 
Aplt. at 5. Defendant further complains that the trial court failed to make specific 
findings regarding the materiality of the claimed omission, and thus failed to comply with 
Franks v. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154 (1978) and State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 (Utah), cert, 
denied. 480 U.S. 930 (1987). Br. of Aplt. at 5. Franks and Nielsen recognize that a 
defendant is entitled to challenge the validity of a search warrant upon "a substantial 
preliminary showing," Franks. 483 U.S. at 171-72, that (i) the affiant "made a false 
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth," and (ii) the 
affidavit is otherwise insufficient to establish probable cause after the misstatement is set 
aside. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188. This same test applies "when a misstatement occurs 
because information is omitted[.]" IsL If the allegations of falsity and/or reckless 
omission are established by a preponderance of the evidence, the seized contraband must 
be suppressed, unless, setting aside the established misrepresentations, the affidavit is 
adequate to establish probable cause. Franks. 438 U.S. at 156. 
Defendant Concedes Franks/Nielsen Issue Below 
In the present case, defendant questioned Deputy Norton concerning his 
preparation of the affidavit at the suppression hearing (R. 247, 250-52). Deputy Norton 
admitted that he knew Rowley lived with Linda Jacobs and not with defendant and that he 
10 
failed to affirmatively state that fact in the affidavit (R. 247, 263). However, while 
Deputy Norton knew that Rowley lived with Jacobs, he did not know whether Rowley 
kept all his possessions at Jacobs' house (id.). Accordingly, Deputy Norton sought 
authority to search defendant's house for the skull because that was where Jacobs' two 
daughters reported having seen Rowley with the skull (R. 252-53). Prior to signing the 
warrant the magistrate questioned the deputy as to Rowley's residence and Deputy 
Norton explained that Rowley did not reside at the address sought to be searched (R. 
247). 
Following the above questioning, defense counsel conceded that there was 
no indication the deputy intentionally excluded information as to Rowley's residence 
from the affidavit (R. 270-72, 276-77), see addendum B. Rather, defense counsel 
narrowly contended that because the warrant heading named only Rowley and that 
because the affidavit alleged that the skull sought at defendant's residence was alleged to 
belong to Rowley, the affidavit incorrectly suggested that Rowley resided with defendant 
(R. 270-71), see addendum B. 
Waiver and Invited Error 
Defendant's concession that the affidavit manifests no falsity or intentional 
misrepresentation regarding Rowley's residence below constitutes a waiver of that issue 
on appeal. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) ("some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an 
11 
appellate court will review such claim on appeal"). Defendant makes no plain error 
argument, nor does she point to any unusual circumstances that would excuse her failure 
to preserve this issue. State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App. 1991). See 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring appellant's brief to include grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court). 
Perhaps more importantly, having affirmatively disclaimed her assertions of 
intentional falsity and/or material omission below, defendant's claim is appropriately 
rejected as constituting invited error. See State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220-21 (Utah 
1993) (invited error doctrine precludes a party from taking advantage of a claimed error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error). 
No Material Omission 
Even if defendant's Franks/Nielsen claim is deemed appropriately before 
the Court, it is clear the trial court did not view Deputy Norton's failure to include 
Rowley's address in the affidavit as materially effecting the magistrate's probable cause 
determination (R. 297-98), see addendum B. Indeed, the trial court rejected defendant's 
assertions that the affidavit could be misconstrued to suggest that Rowley resided with 
defendant (R. 270-71,279-80,297), S££ addendum B. Rather, the trial court found that 
the affidavit clearly referenced both Linda Jacobs' residence and defendant's residence 
thereby rejecting defendant's assertion that only her residence was mentioned therein (R. 
280, 297), see addendum B. The trial court further ruled that there was no indication that 
12 
Deputy Norton "consciously mislead" the magistrate or otherwise included untruthful 
information in the affidavit (R. 297), see addendum B. Accordingly, the trial court 
concluded that the magistrate reasonably interpreted the affidavit to suggest that Rowley 
was keeping the skull at defendant's house (id.). See State v. Collard. 810 P.2d 884, 
885-86 (Utah App.) ("It is within a magistrate's discretion to construe ambiguity with an 
affidavit."), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). Having ruled considering only the 
four corners of the search warrant affidavit (R. 296), £g£ addendum B, the trial court 
noted that Deputy Norton's testimony that he verbally informed the magistrate that 
Rowley did not reside with defendant lent the magistrate's the probable cause 
determination "greater weight" (R. 298), see addendum B. See State v. Brown. 798 P.2d 
284, 288 (Utah App. 1990) ("trial court is in the best position to assess witness credibility 
in a motion to suppress hearing"). 
The trial court's reading of the affidavit is reasonable and should be upheld. 
While the affidavit could perhaps have been clearer as to where Rowley resided, it did not 
affirmatively represent that Rowley lived with defendant (R. 22-18), see addendum A. 
Deputy Norton's failure to allege where Rowley resided is comparable to a minor 
discrepancy which does not undermine the essential truth of the allegations or rise to the 
level of a knowing, intentional, or reckless misrepresentation. State v. Slowe. 728 P.2d 
110 (Utah 1985). Indeed, this Court has rejected similar Franks allegations as 
inconsequential. See State v. Weaver. 817 P.2d 830, 834 (Utah App. 1991) (slight 
13 
difference between witnesses statements as reported in affidavit and their trial testimony 
determined inconsequential to probable cause determination); State v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 
1319, 1324 (Utah App.) (rejecting claim of falsity where trial court reasonably interpreted 
inartfully drafted sentence to support magistrate's probable cause determination), cert, 
denied, 826 P.2d 851 (Utah 1991); State v. Moore. 788 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah App.) 
(rejecting Franks allegation on ground that technically incomplete affidavit did not 
amount to false omission), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). Accord State v. 
Poland. 645 P.2d 784, 794-95 (Ariz. 1982) (recklessness exists only if the affiant 
seriously doubts the truth of his statements), cert, granted. 474 U.S. 816 (1985), judgment 
affirmed. 476 U.S. 147 (1986); State v. Lindner. 592 P.2d 852, 856-57 (Idaho 1979) 
(warrant not rendered invalid because of unintentional oversight). The Court should 
likewise reject defendant's claim. 
Current Probable Cause 
Second, defendant contends that the affidavit was stale because Rowley 
showed the skull to Crystal Jacobs at defendant's residence approximately three weeks 
prior to the warrants issuance. Br. of Aplt. at 7-9. Defendant's staleness challenge is 
based entirely on her claim that the affidavit failed to demonstrate "any continuing 
presence" by Rowley at her house. Br. of Aplt. at 9. However, the trial court determined 
that Crystal's descriptive observation that the skull was "repackaged and put away" in 
defendant's house reasonably suggested to the magistrate that although Rowley did not 
14 
live with defendant, he was storing the skull on defendant's premises and therefore the 
skull was likely to be found there even three weeks later (R. 270-71, 279-86, 297-98), see 
addendum B. 
Staleness issues typically arise when a "significant lapse of time occurs 
between the discovery of information suggesting that evidence of a crime can be found at 
a particular locale and the magistrate's finding of probable cause or the execution of the 
warrant." State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993). The issue is whether so 
much time has elapsed that there is no longer probable cause to believe that the 
contraband is still on the suspected premises. IdL "However, the mere passage of time 
does not necessarily invalidate the supporting basis for the warrant." State v. Singleton. 
854 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). See United States v. Rahn. 
511 F.2d 290, 293 (10th Cir.) ("probable cause is not determined by merely counting the 
number of days between the time of the facts relied upon and the warrant's issuance"), 
cert, denied. 423 U.S. 825 (1975). Indeed, where the affidavit contains facts indicating a 
continuing activity or course of conduct, "the passage of time becomes less significant." 
Singleton. 854 P.2d at 1021 (citation omitted). £££, s ^ , Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1260 
(rejecting Thurman's claim that several months lapse of time between initial discovery of 
his motive to commit crime and warrant's issuance rendered probable cause to believe 
that he committed offense stale). 
15 
In the present case, the affidavit suggests that Rowley was involved in a 
course of criminal conduct, that of pilfering antiquities. Specifically, a dinosaur bone 
alleged to belong to Rowley was observed at Rowley's girlfriend's house, Linda Jacobs 
(R. 21), gee addendum A. Linda Jacobs' daughter Crystal reported that Rowley showed 
her a human skull while the two of them were at defendant's house and further reported 
that Rowley had "dug up" that and other "skulls" while "he was hunting and trapping" (R. 
20), see addendum A. Rowley was also reported to have shown Linda Jacobs' other 
daughter, Kathy, a skull as well (R. 20-29), S££ addendum A. Consistent with these 
reports, Deputy Norton confirmed that Rowley was indeed a professional hunter (R. 20), 
reasonably suggesting the opportunity to explore for and pilfer ancient artifacts. Thus, 
the affidavit supports the supposition that Rowley's alleged pilfering of antiquities 
constituted more than an isolated incident. Singleton. 854 P.2d at 1021. 
Moreover, an ancient human skull is not the type of item that is disposed of 
easily. £e£ Gerdes v. State, 319 N.W.2d 710, 713 (Minn. 1982) (rejecting staleness 
challenge to search warrant for stolen traffic control devices which "fall into the category 
of items that are unlikely to be disposed of quickly"). Indeed, the trial court upheld the 
magistrate's probable cause determination based on the fact that the skull was being kept 
or stored at defendant's residence thereby increasing the likelihood the skull would be 
found there three weeks later (R. 280-86). see addendum B. 
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It makes sense that the skull would be "put away" (R. 20), see addendum A, 
or "stored" (R. 283), see addendum B. Like the traffic control devices in Gerdes. a 
human skull is hardly the typical "kind of item accepted by pawn shops or other potential 
repositories of stolen goods." 319N.W.2dat713. See Commonwealth v. Early. 345 
A.2d 197 (Pa. Super 1975) (stressing antique sterling silver pieces not "readily saleable" 
and thus likely to be on searched premises two weeks after initial sighting). See also 
State v. BoswelL 206 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. App. 1974) (relevant to staleness issue whether 
goods are "disposable by sale on the open market or through fences or clandestinely"). It 
is further reasonable to infer from the dinosaur bone and skulls listed in the affidavit that 
Rowley collected a variety of antiquities and was thus likely to store the skull indefinitely 
for his own purposes. See, e.g.. Gerdes. 319 N.W.2d at 713 (no ready market for stolen 
traffic control devices which, moreover, are often made part of the home decor). Finally, 
any attempt to dispose of the unique ancient artifact would certainly have increased 
Rowley's risk of detection. IcL (recognizing that attempt to dispose of conspicuous traffic 
control devices in a small town would likely have led to detection); Rahn. 511 F.2d at 293 
(rejecting staleness challenge based on former ATF agent defendant's alleged illegal 
possession of firearms one and half years earlier on ground that magistrate made common 
sense determination that the defendant realized the risk of detection if he attempted to sell 
the weapons). 
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Based on the above, the trial court reasonably determined to uphold the 
magistrate's common sensical finding of current probable cause to believe that Rowley 
was keeping or storing the skull at defendant's residence and that the skull was thus likely 
to be found therein even several weeks later. In so doing, the trial court expressly noted 
its duty to "defer to the reasonable interpretations" of the magistrate and to review the 
affidavit in a non-hypertechnical manner (R. 279), see addendum B. See State v. Collard. 
810 P.2d 884, 885-86 (Utah App.) (Fourth Amendment's strong preference for warrant 
supported searches requires not a hypertechnical, but a common sense review of search 
warrant affidavit), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). Recognizing these same 
principles, this Court should similarly affirm the trial court's ruling.4 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE 
SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH THAT THE SKULL WAS 
ILLEGALLY POSSESSED OR COULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN OBTAINED BY SUBPOENA 
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that the mere possession of 
antiquities is not a crime and that the search warrant affidavit failed to indicate that 
Rowley illegally obtained the sought-for-skull. Br. of Aplt. at 9,11. Defendant further 
4
 In Point IV of her brief, defendant asserts that if the search warrant affidavit 
is invalidated, the evidence is not otherwise admissible under the plain view exception to 
the warrant requirement. Br. of Aplt. at 11-12. The State does not rely on the plain view 
exception or any justification other than the warrant supported search as a basis for the 
seizure of contraband in this case. 
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claims that the affidavit failed to indicate that the skull could not have been obtained by 
subpoena. Br. of Aplt. at 11. These claims are raised for the first time on appeal and are 
therefore waived. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) ("some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal"). As noted in the statements 
of the case and the facts, supra, no formal motion to suppress appears in the record on 
appeal in this case. Sg£ Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989) ("If an 
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below.") (citations omitted), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 1033 
(1990); State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) (appellant has the "duty and 
responsibility" of supporting claimed error with adequate record, absent which, the 
reviewing court has no power to determine"), cert, denied. 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). 
Defendant failed to advance these precise arguments at the suppression hearing (R. 269-
81). Rather, defendant's concerns at the suppression hearing focused primarily on the 
affidavit's failure to state where Rowley lived and the likelihood that the skull would be 
found at defendant's residence approximately three weeks after it was observed there 
(id.). Defendant makes no claim of plain error or exceptional circumstances that would 
excuse her waiver of these issues. State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App. 
1991). They should not be considered. 
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To the extent that defendant's claims are unanalyzed, particularly his 
conclusory assertion that the affidavit failed to indicate whether the skull was obtainable 
pursuant to a subpoena, they may be rejected on that ground as well. State v. Price. 827 
P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992) (declining to reach unanalyzed issues). £££ also Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9) (appellant's brief must "contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on"). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should uphold the warrant authorizing 
a search of defendant's premises and affirm her conviction. 
STATEMENT REGARDING NEED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Due to the fact dependent nature of the issue preservation and fourth 
amendment questions raised in this case, the analytical paths that may be taken are many. 
Accordingly, oral argument would greatly assist resolution of the issues and should be 
entertained. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^day of April, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the Ji2day of, April 1996,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE 







^ UINTAH COUNTY. UTAH 
/ FEB 2 8 1995 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, s 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT AND ORDER 
FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
vs. : 
DALLAS ROWLEY, : CASE NO. 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH } 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UINTAH } 
The Affiant undersigned being sworn states on oath: 
1. I am a peace officer in the State of Utah. I have 
been a police officer for more than one year. For all of that time 
I have been employed by the Uintah County Sheriff's Office. I am 
assigned to the patrol division. My duties there have included the 
investigation of property crimes. During my career I have been 
involved in the investigation and/or arrests of at least one 
hundred (100) persons for property crimes. 
I attended the Utah Police Academy and am currently 
a certified police officer in the State of Utah* During my career, 
I have attended many hours of in service training which includes 
training into the investigation of property crimes. 
S3 
2. The property for which a search warrant is sought is 
described as follows: human skulls, human skeletal remains, burial 
artifacts and associated items. 
3. The grounds for issuing a search warrant, as 
provided by Utah Code Annotated 77-23-202, are as follows: the 
property is evidence of illegal conduct, or was unlawfully acquired 
or unlawfully possessed, or is used to conceal or commit any crime. 
4. I have probable cause to believe, and do believe, 
that the property is located on the premises known or described as: 
3975 South Vernal Avenue, Vernal, Uintah County, Utah, a residence 
at the corner of Vernal Avenue and 4000 South Street, consisting of 
two brown and white single-wide mobile homes joined under one roof, 
a shed, and numerous junk automobiles and any motor vehicles 
located at the residence or parked on public streets immediately 
adjacent thereto. 
5. The facts to establish the grounds for the issuance 
of a search warrant are: 
a. On Tuesday, January 17, 1995, I spoke with Don 
Jacobs who was then at the residence of his ex-
wife, Linda Jacobs, Don Jacobs told me that he 
then saw a large bone which he believed to be a 
dinosaur bone in Linda Jacob's residence. I also 
heard Don Jacob's daughter, Crystal Jacobs, tell 
Don Jacobs that she had seen a human skull. Don 
Jacobs then told me that Linda Jacob's boyfriend, 
Dallas Rowley, currently possessed an American 
Indian human skull. 
On Friday, January 20, 1995, Detective Wayne 
Hollebeke and your affiant interviewed Crystal 
Jacobs* Crystal Jacobs is eight years old. 
Crystal Jacobs told me that she had been shown a 
human skull at the Beth Smuin house by Dallas 
Rowley. She described the house as being a trailer 
on the corner up from her house and as having many 
junk cars in front. Crystal said that the skull 
was brought in the main room and placed onto the 
top of the television, then it was repackaged and 
put away. She said that this occurred in the past 
several weeks. She told me that she had been told 
that the skulls were dug up by Dallas Rowley when 
he was hunting and trapping. 
I drove to 3975 South Vernal Avenue, Vernal, Utah 
and saw a residence consisting of two trailer homes 
joined under a single roof. There were several 
junk cars immediately outside the residence. The 
residence is visible from the Linda Jacob's 
residence, just up the street and on the corner. 
It is in all respects consistent with the 
description given by Crystal Jacobs. 
Don Jacobs told me that he saw animal pelts at 
Linda Jacob's residence that he believed were 
illegally taken by Dallas Rowley. I learned from 
A.P. & P. Special Agent Jim Murray that Dallas 
Rowley is a professional hunter and is on 
probation. He was previously charged with numerous 
weapons violations as well as illegally taking big 
game in Colroado. I have not been able to yet 
determine the dispositin of these charges. 
On January 20, 1995, I spoke with Mrs. Beverly 
Jacobs who told me that her granddaughter, Kathy 
Jacobs, another daughter of Linda and Don Jacobs, 
told her not long ago that she had seen human 
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skulls shown to her by Dallas Rowley. 
DATE SIGNED: \->1 - f C TIME SIGNED: i'-(^^.\AA 
rf mJjikk L. VANCE'jJORTON 
This Affidavit was sworn to be before me by Affidavit on the 
date and at the time shown. 
COURT JUDGE 
ft 
IT IS ORDERED that a search warrant be issued for the articles 
and places described in the above affidavit, for an immediate 
search in the daytime and upon notice. 
DATE SIGNED: (-yo^T TIME SIGNED^ JJ/C^?^' 
v/x/^^ 
I STRICT ^ OURT JUDGE 
\% 
ADDENDUM B 
BUT THE PROBLEM WITH THE WARRANT IN THAT CASE WAS THAT THERE 
WAS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN MR. STANLEY AND THE PLACE TO BE 
SEARCHED. 
THIS IS A MUCH DIFFERENT CASE. THERE IS A DEFINITE 
CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE 
OBSERVATION OF THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL CONDUCT. 
MR. BEASLIN: I THINK IT'S EVEN WORSE IN THIS CASE 
WHERE THE SEARCH WARRANT TOGETHER WITH EVERYTHING HAS BEEN, IS 
IN THE NAME OF DALLAS ROWLEY, DOES NOT STATE THE NAME OF THESE 
DEFENDANTS AT ALL, YOUR HONOR. THERE IS NO CONNECTION AT ALL 
THAT MR. ROWLEY RESIDED AT THAT ADDRESS AND SO FORTH. AND, 
CERTAINLY, BASED ON THAT I THINK THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD 
BE GRANTED. 
THE COURT: MR. WILLIAMS? 
MR. WILLIAMS: YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE TO LOOK AT THIS 
CASE AT TWO LEVELS, I SUPPOSE. I THINK THE CRITICAL ISSUE 
HERE IS WE START WITH STALENESS. NOW, THE STALENESS CASE LAW, 
THERE IS NO FIRM RULE. WHILE I HAVE SEEN CASES INDICATING 
THAT — I HAVE SEEN SOME CASES SHOWING INFORMATION THAT WAS 36 
HOURS OLD WAS TOO STALE TO BE RELIABLE. BUT I HAVE ALSO SEEN 
CASES INDICATING OLDER. THE CRITICAL FACTORS TO BE LOOKED AT 
ON A STALENESS ISSUE IS NOT JUST THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION 
WHICH IN THIS CASE IS LISTED AS BEING SEVERAL WEEKS. 
NOW, WHAT DOES SEVERAL WEEKS MEAN? I SUPPOSE WE 




BY "SEVERAL" TO MEAN, BUT I WOULD SUBMIT THAT THE COMMON SENSE 
MEANS AT LEAST MORE THAN TWO AND SEEMS TO IMPLY USUALLY 
SOMETHING EVEN MORE THAN THREE WEEKS. WOULD HE TAKE 
INFORMATION THAT IS IN MULTIPLE WEEKS OLD? AND WE HAVE TO 
TAKE A LOOK THEN AT OTHER FACTORS, WHAT OTHER FACTORS ARE 
THERE ON THE WARRANT FACIALLY THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT THE 
ALLEGED EVIDENCE OF A CRIME, THE SKULL, WOULD STILL BE THERE. 
NOW, IN THIS CASE THERE WAS NO INFORMATION 
PRESENTED TO THE JUDGE OTHER THAN A POINT IN TIME THAT IT WAS 
THERE. WHAT WAS NOT PRESENTED TO THE JUDGE CLEARLY. IN FACT, 
THE FAIR IMPLICATION OF WHAT WAS PRESENTED TO THE JUDGE IS 
THAT MR. ROWLEY DID RESIDE AT THAT ADDRESS WHEN, IN FACT, HE 
DID NOT. AND THE OFFICERS KNEW HE DID NOT RESIDE AT THAT 
ADDRESS. 
THE COURT: WELL, LET ME ASK YOU THIS: WHERE ARE 
YOU TAKING — WHAT LANGUAGE IN THE AFFIDAVIT DO YOU BELIEVE 
WAS AN INDICATION THAT MR. ROWLEY LIVED THERE? 
MR. WILLIAMS: I START WITH THE FACE OF THE WARRANT 
ITSELF. IT SAYS STATE VERSUS DALLAS ROWLEY. 
THE COURT: WELL, MR. — 
MR. WILLIAMS: MAY I — YOU ASKED ME AND I WOULD 
LIKE TO GIVE YOU THE SEVERAL FACTORS. 
THE COURT: WELL, I AM GOING TO CUT YOU OFF THEN. 
MR. WILLIAMS: OKAY. 




THE HEADING ON THE WARRANT BE IN THE NAME OF THE PERSON WHOSE 
PROPERTY IS TO BE SOUGHT. FOR INSTANCE, IT MAY BE THAT 
PROPERTY IS SOUGHT AT A PLACE WHERE PROPERTY IS STORED. AND I 
HAVE SEEN WARRANTS IN THAT CASE. THEY DON'T PUT THE NAME OF 
THE PERSON WHO OWNS THE PROPERTY THERE, THEY PUT THE NAME OF 
THE DEFENDANT IN THE AFFIDAVIT. AND, IN MY EXPERIENCE, I 
DON'T KNOW OF ANY LAW THAT WOULD REQUIRE THAT WHEN THEY 
PREPARE THE AFFIDAVIT ON THE HEADING OF THE AFFIDAVIT THEY PUT 
THE PROPERTY OWNER THERE. I HAVE NEVER SEEN ANY CASE THAT 
SAYS THEY HAVE TO DO THAT. 
MR. WILLIAMS: NEITHER HAVE I, YOUR HONOR. 
HOWEVER, WHAT I AM TRYING TO POINT OUT IS THIS IS ONE FACTOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WILLIAMS: IF WE TAKE ANY INDIVIDUAL THING IN 
ISOLATION, I DON'T KNOW THAT THERE IS ANYTHING IN THE WARRANT, 
IN THE AFFIDAVIT FOR WARRANT WHICH IS SPECIFICALLY FALSE. 
WHAT I AM TRYING TO POINT OUT IS THAT THE FAIR IMPLICATION OF 
ALL OF THESE THINGS TAKEN TOGETHER WAS THAT DALLAS ROWLEY DID 
RESIDE AT THAT HOME; WHEREAS, THE OFFICER SPECIFICALLY KNEW 
THAT HE DID NOT. 
NOW/' I SAID THE FIRST FACTOR WAS A DESCRIPTION OF, 
YOU KNOW, ON THE FACE OF STATE VERSUS DALLAS ROWLEY. 
SECONDLY, THERE IS A DESCRIPTION OF DALLAS ROWLEY BEING IN 
POSSESSION OF OTHER SKULL OR SKULLS. I WOULD POINT OUT THAT 




BONES. TALKS ABOUT — EVERYTHING IS REINFORCING. THE IDEA IS 
PRESENTED IN A WAY TO REINFORCE THE CRITICAL PARAGRAPH, 
PARAGRAPH 5(B). AND EVERYTHING HAS TALKED ABOUT DALLAS ROWLEY 
POSSESSES THIS, DALLAS ROWLEY POSSESSES THIS. BUT WHEN WE GET 
DOWN TO THE ACTUAL INFORMATION RELATING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE, THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROBABLE CAUSE BEING WHAT 
EVIDENCE IS THERE THAT A SPECIFIC PIECE OF PROPERTY IS 
EVIDENCE OF A CRIME AND THAT IT IS GOING TO BE IN THE PLACE 
WHERE THE POLICE WANT TO SEARCH AT THE TIME AND PLACE THEY 
WANT TO SEARCH IT. 
NOW, 5(B) IS THE ONLY THING THAT REALLY ADDRESSES 
THAT. IT SAYS SEVERAL WEEKS AGO IN A HOME DESCRIBED AS BETH 
SMUIN'S, BUT IMPLIED, IMPLIED I AM SAYING, BY THE OTHER THINGS 
SURROUNDING IT TO BE DALLAS ROWLEY'S, THAT DALLAS ROWLEY HAD 
IN HIS POSSESSION A SKULL. DOESN'T SAY INDIAN SKULL. DOESN'T 
SAY HOW HE GOT IT. DOESN'T GIVE US ANY INDICATIONS THAT IT 
WAS ILLEGALLY TAKEN. THE LAW REFERRED TO DOES NOT HAVE AN ALL 
OUT PROHIBITION AGAINST ANY POSSESSION OF SKULLS OR EVEN 
INDIAN SKULLS. IT WAS OPENED UP. IT WAS REPACKAGED. 
NOW, WHAT IS THERE TO TIE THAT TO STILL BE AT THAT 
SAME LOCATION SEVERAL WEEKS LATER? HAD DALLAS ROWLEY RESIDED 
AT THAT ADDRESS, THAT WOULD BE A FACTOR THAT COULD HAVE BEEN 
CONSIDERED AS TO WHY THREE, TWO TO THREE WEEK OLD EVIDENCE 
MIGHT STILL BE FRESH EVIDENCE. BUT, SPECIFICALLY, IT WAS 




1 I STORED ANY PROPERTY THERE. THERE WAS NO INDICATION WHATSOEVER 
2 THAT, IF ANYTHING, THAT HE HAD MOMENTARILY BEEN THERE SEVERAL 
3 WEEKS BEFORE. AND I WOULD SUBMIT SEVERAL WEEKS BEFORE, 
4 SEVERAL WEEKS, SO VAGUE AND BROAD, WE MIGHT EVEN BE TALKING 
5 ABOUT TO HALLOWEEN, WHICH IS A TYPICAL TIME WHEN SKULLS ARE 
6 EXHIBITED. 
7 WE HAVE A POINT IN TIME WHEN HE WAS AT SOMEBODY'S 
8 HOUSE, ACCORDING TO THE INFORMATION, AND EXHIBITED A SKULL. 
9 AND HE PUT IT BACK IN THE PACKAGE. AS I SAY, THE CRITICAL 
10 ISSUE IS STALENESS. 
11 I NOW, WITHOUT SOMETHING MORE THAN A POINT IN TIM* *T 
12 A PLACE OTHER THAN HIS RESIDENCE, I THINK IT IS CLEAR, I DON'T 
13 THINK IT'S EVEN A CLOSE CASE, THAT THIS WARRANT IS INVALID ON 
14 THAT BASIS OF STALE INFORMATION AND EVERYTHING ELSE. WE THEN 
15 J MOVE TO THE SECOND ISSUE WHICH IS THE GOOD FAITH ISSUE. IN 
16 ROWE, EVERYBODY SEEMS TO AGREE, SEEMS TO BE THE CONTROLLING 
17 AUTHORITY ON THAT. 
18 NOW, ROWE PUTS REFERRING TO THE LEON AND REFERRING 
19 PROBABLY MOST SPECIFICALLY TO FOUR LEON FACTORS OF THE SUM OF 
20 A WARRANT BEING INVALID ON ITS FACE, PUTS OFFICERS TO A 
21 I REASONABLE OBJECTIVE STANDARD AS TO WHAT THEIR KNOWLEDGE 
22 SHOULD BE OF WARRANTS BEFORE THEY CAN RELY ON THEM. IT IS 
23 APPARENT THAT SUBJECTIVELY OFFICER NORTON DID NOT UNDERSTAND 
24 THE CONCEPT OF STALENESS AND DID NOT DO ANYTHING ON THE FACE 




HE IS SUBJECT TO THAT OBJECTIVE REASONABLE STANDARD OF KE WAS 
SUPPOSED TO KNOW ABOUT STALENESS. HE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE IN A 
POSITION TO UNDERSTAND ITS CONCEPTS AND BE ABLE TO ADDRESS 
THEM. AND ANY REASONABLE OFFICER KNOWS THAT IF HE GETS A 
REPORT THAT THREE WEEKS AGO SO-AND-SO USED A DRUG PIPE AT 
SUCH-AND-SUCH A LOCATION, BUT HE DIDN'T LIVE AT THAT HOUSE, 
THAT SO-AND-SO POSSESSED A DRUG PIPE THREE WEEKS AGO AND WAS 
AT SOMEBODY'S HOUSE, ANY REASONABLE OBJECTIVE OFFICER KNOWS 
THAT IS NOT PROBABLE CAUSE, THAT IT IS STILL THERE THREE WEEKS 
LATER. WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT SOMETHING BIG THAT CANNOT BE 
MOVED. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT SOMETHING THAT IS PROBABLY A 
MAXIMUM OF 12 BY 12. AND CONSIDERING THE TIME FRAME, WHEN WE 
DEAL WITH EVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A HALLOWEEN TYPE OF 
SITUATION, IT IS ENTIRELY LOGICAL; IN FACT, IT IS EVEN 
PROBABLE THAT AN OBJECTIVE OFFICER LOOKING AT IT WOULD SAY IT 
IS NOT THERE ANY MORE BECAUSE HE DOESN'T LIVE THERE. IT'S THE 
KIND OF THING HE WOULD BRING OUT AND SHOW BRIEFLY, PUT IT 
AWAY, TAKE IT HOME. 
OBJECTIVE STANDARD IS WHAT I AM POINTING OUT, YOUR 
HONOR. AND I DON'T SEE THAT THAT THIS SHOULD BE TREATED ANY 
DIFFERENT THAN ANY OTHER SMALL PORTABLE PROPERTY WHICH IS 
BROUGHT TO SOMEBODY'S HOME FOR VERY, VERY LIMITED PURPOSE AT A 
VERY LIMITED TIME, AND THEN GOES WITH THE PERSON TO THE PLACE 
WHERE IT WOULD NORMALLY BE STORED, WHICH WOULDN'T BE THE 




THAT OBJECTIVE STANDARD WE DO NOT HAVE GOOD FAITH. AND I 
THINK THE ROWE DECISION WAS A FAIRLY WELL REASONED DECISION 
WHEN IT PLACED THAT OBJECTIVE STANDARD AS THE UTAH STANDARD IN 
LOOKING AT. 
NOW, THE ROWE DECISION IS BASED PRIMARILY ON 
FEDERAL GROUNDS. HOWEVER, THERE IS A FAIR IMPLICATION IN IT 
THAT STATES THAT STATE GROUNDS WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY BRIEFED 
IN IT. CITES THE MENDOZA CASE IN A FOOTNOTE, AS I RECALL. 
BUT, NEVERTHELESS, I THINK A FAIR READING OF THE ROWE CASE IS 
THAT IT IS ESTABLISHING NOT ONLY HOW IT IS INTERPRETING THE 
FEDERAL GROUNDS BUT SAYING THIS IS THE RULES FOR THE STATE OF 
UTAH, WE ARE ESTABLISHING THIS AS THE UTAH RULE. 
THE COURT: WHEN I READ IT IN THE FOOT NOTE IT 
SEEMED TO ME IT WAS SAYING JUST THE OPPOSITE, THEY WERE NOT 
GOING TO TAKE ANY POSITION ON THAT BECAUSE IT WASN'T BRIEFED 
AND ARGUED. 
MR. WILLIAMS: YES. CLEARLY IT WAS NOT BRIEFED AND 
ARGUED. WHAT I AM SAYING IS NOT NECESSARILY ON THE 
INDEPENDENT UTAH GROUNDS. I THINK IT IS VERY CLEAR THEY ARE 
SAYING THIS IS THE UTAH RULE. 
THE COURT: IN INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION. 
MR. WILLIAMS: YES. 
THE COURT: THEY WERE INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL 




DISTINGUISH THE RESULT UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS 
IMPOSED FROM THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, SO THAT'S HOW I AM LOOKING 
AT IT. 
MR. WILLIAMS: AND I THINK THAT'S THE PROPER WAY. 
HOWEVER, IT WAS CLEAR. AND I DON'T REMEMBER THE CASE, 
SPECIFIC CALIFORNIA CASE THAT WAS REFERRED TO WHEN THEY WENT 
THROUGH ADOPTING THIS OBJECTIVE STANDARD. BUT THAT THEY DID 
SPECIFICALLY ADOPT A CALIFORNIA CASE. SO THERE WAS OTHER LAW 
RELATING TO THIS OBJECTIVE STANDARD AS THEY WERE VIEWING IT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. I THINK THAT THERE ARE TWO AREAS 
THAT YOU LOOK AT THE GOOD FAITH OF A POLICE OFFICER. THE 
OTHER ONE IS GOOD FAITH OF A POLICE OFFICER IN THE PREPARATION 
OF AND SUBMISSION OF THE MATTER TO THE MAGISTRATE TO THE 
INTEGRITY OF THE PROPERTIES. AND I HAVEN'T HEARD YOU ARGUE 
THAT. AND I HAVEN'T SEEN ANYTHING IN THE RECORD THAT WOULD 
INDICATE THE OFFICER ACTED IN A WAY THAT WAS DESIGNED TO 
PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE MAGISTRATE THAT WAS NOT TRUE OR 
THAT WAS AN INACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF WHAT THE OFFICER MEANT. 
MR. WILLIAMS: YOUR HONOR, AS FAR AS THERE BEING AN 
INTENTIONAL DISREGARD OF THE PROCESS, I DON'T SUPPOSE THAT WE 
HAVE ANY TRUE INDICATIONS OF THAT. BUT I BELIEVE ROWE SAYS 
THAT DOESN'T MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE. IF WE HAVE AN OFFICER — 
THE COURT: IT WOULD IN THE APPROPRIATE CASE. 
MR. WILLIAMS: IN THE APPROPRIATE CASE, IT WOULD. 
BUT, NEVERTHELESS, TO SAY AN OFFICER IS INTENTIONALLY MESSING 
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WITH THE SYSTEM IS GOING FAR BEYOND WHAT WAS EVEN DISCUSSED IN 
ROWE OR WHAT WE ARE DISCUSSING HERE. NEVERTHELESS, 
INTENTIONAL OR OTHERWISE, IF AN OFFICER FLAT OUT BLOWS IT, AND 
I THINK WE HAVE SEVERAL INDICATIONS THAT HE DID HERE, NO HE 
DID NOT INTENTIONALLY MISREPRESENT THINGS TO JUDGE ANDERSON, 
BUT HE OMITTED SOMETHING THAT HE KNEW THAT REALLY IS A FAIRLY 
CRITICAL ISSUE, HE NEVER FLAT OUT STATED, I KNOW DALLAS ROWLEY 
LIVES SIX HOUSES AWAY. 
THE COURT: HIS TESTIMONY HERE TODAY WAS THAT HE 
VERBALLY TOLD JUDGE ANDERSON THAT. BUT THAT'S NOT CONTAINED 
IN THE AFFIDAVIT. 
MR. WILLIAMS: THAT'S NOT CONTAINED IN THE 
AFFIDAVIT, AND WE ARE DEALING WITH THE AFFIDAVIT ON THE FACE 
AT THIS POINT AS FAR AS THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE WARRANT. 
I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT A NUMBER OF FACTORS THAT 
I THINK GIVE A FAIR IMPLICATION HEDGING AROUND THE ISSUE. I 
THINK IT'S A LACK OF EXPERIENCE. IT'S A LACK OF ART. IT'S A 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE. NOT AN INTENTIONAL BUT, NEVERTHELESS, THE 
FAIR IMPLICATION OF ALL OF THIS SEEMS TO BE THAT DALLAS ROWLEY 
RESIDED AT 3975 SOUTH VERNAL AVENUE. 
NOW, THE FACT THAT IT'S INTENTIONAL OR WHETHER IT'S 
JUST A MISTAKE, WHEN WE LOOK AT THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD, 
DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE. HAD THE COURT GIVEN US A 
SUBJECTIVE STANDARD, WHICH THEY DID NOT, THAT COULD MAKE A 
DIFFERENCE. I BELIEVE THE REASON WHY THEY DID NOT GO WITH THE 
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SUBJECTIVE STANDARD IS THEY DIDN'T WANT TO MAKE STUPIDITY AS A 
A DEFENSE, SO TO SPEAK. IT'S VERY, VERY EASY AND VERY, VERY 
CONVENIENT FOR AN OFFICER TO COME IN AND SAY, HEY, I DID THE 
BEST I COULD, BUT I DON'T KNOW WHAT I AM DOING, THEREFORE, I 
ACTED IN GOOD FAITH. AND THAT WAS SPECIFICALLY REJECTED AND 
THAT'S PRETTY CONSISTENT IN ALL THESE SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
ISSUES THAT HAVE EVER COME UP, IS THAT WE ARE LOOKING AT AN 
OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF A REASONABLY WELL TRAINED OFFICER. 
I THINK THE INCENTIVE THERE IS SUPPOSED TO BE 
REASONABLY WELL TRAINED OFFICERS SHOULD ASSIST THOSE WHO ARE 
NOT WELL TRAINED. AND PERHAPS IT MAY BE THAT THE REAL FA^LT 
IN THIS CASE LIES WITH MR. HOLLEBEKE WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE MUCH 
MORE EXPERIENCE WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE ASSISTED MR. NORTON 
IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS. 
I KNOW MR. HOLLEBEKE HAS COME ACROSS THIS SPECIFIC 
ISSUE ON ONE OR TWO CASES BECAUSE I HAVE ARGUED IT FROM BOTH 
SIDES OF THE TABLE. AND THAT'S NOT BEFORE THE COURT. NO, WE 
ARE NOT SAYING GOOD FAITH — LEON LISTED FOUR SPECIFIC REASONS 
WHY THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION WOULD NOT APPLY. AND ONE OF THEM 
I THINK THAT YOU ARE REFERRING TO IS A SPECIFIC BAD FAITH AS 
TO THE SYSTEM ITSELF. WHAT WE ARE ARGUING AND WHAT ROWE 
RECOGNIZES, I BELIEVE, IS THE SECOND OF THE FOUR, WHICH IS 
JUST THIS IS INVALID ON ITS FACE AND ANYBODY WHO HAS ANY 
REASONABLE TRAINING KNOWS THAT THIS IS INVALID ON ITS FACE. 




THE FACTS OF THE WHOLE IMPLICATION AND THE WAY THIS WAS 
WRITTEN OMITTED A CRITICAL FACT WHICH RELATES TO THAT 
STALENESS ISSUE. 
THE COURT: COUPLE df- QUESTIONS? 
IN REVIEWING THIS, I AM TO DEFER TO THE REASONABLE 
INTERPRETATIONS THAT THE MAGISTRATE IN THIS CASE, JUDGE 
ANDERSON, I • • - - tf THE WARRANT, AND 
NOT TO BE HYPERTECHNICAL IN DOING THAT. DO YOU AGREE THAT 
THAT'S THE REVIEW PROCESS? 
MR. WILLIAMS: THAT'S THE NORMAL PROCEDURE, 
ALTHOUGH I HAVE FOUND SOME SOFTENING OF THAT DIFFERENCE WHEN I 
ARGUED THIS SAME ISSUE AT THE COURT OF APPEALS ON STATE VERSUS 
HORTON THREE YEARS AGO. AT LEAST WHAT MPLIED TO ME 
WAS THAT WE GIVE DEFENSE, BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN WE ARE GOING 
TO BEND OVER BACKWARDS. IT'S CLEARLY A REVIEW OF WHAT APPEARS 
TO BE A NORMAL FACIALLY VALID DOCUMENT. BUT IT'S NOT A TOTAL 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TYPE OF STANDARD, IT'S JUST GIVING 
DEFENSE. 
THE COURT: IN THE AFFIDAVIT YOU TALKED ABOUT A 
COUPLE OF THINGS: DISTINGUISHING THE RESIDENCE. IN PARAGRAPH 
5(A) IT TALKS ABOUT DON. SECOND SENTENCE, "DON JACOBS TOLD ME 
THAT HE THEN bARGE BONE WHICH HE BELIEVED TO BE A 
DINOSAUR BONE IN LINDA JACOB'S RESIDENCE." AND IN PARAGRAPH 
5(B) IT TALKS ABOUT — SECOND SENTENCE AGAIN. "CRYSTAL JACOBS 




HOUSE." AND TVAT WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THERE WERE TWO 
RESIDENCES WHICH WERE REFERRED TO IN THE AFFIDAVIT. ONE BEING 
THE LINDA JACOBS RESIDENCE AND THE OTHER ONE THE SMUIN HOUSE. 
OH, AND THEN THE OTHER LANGUAGE I WANTED TO ASK YOU ABOUT, I 
GUESS THAT'S JUST AN OBSERVATION OF SOMETHING YOU SAID THAT 
THE AFFIDAVIT SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE 
RESIDENCE INVOLVED. AND I DON'T SEE THAT BECAUSE OF THE 
LANGUAGE THAT I HAVE JUST SEEN. BUT WHAT I WOULD LIKE YOU TO 
FOCUS INTO I S THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE IN 5 ( B ) . AND YOU'VE USED 
THE EXAMPLE OF SOMEBODY SMOKING MARIJUANA AND THE MARIJUANA 
PIPE SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. AND I F THAT'S ALL THE INFORMATION 
t 
THAT THE PERSON HAD, I BELIEVE YOUR WORDS WAS THAT THERE WOULD 
BE AN INFERENCE THAT HE PUT I T AWAY AND TOOK I T WITH HIM. BUT 
THE LANGUAGE IN THIS PARTICULAR PART OF THE AFFIDAVIT SAYS, 
CRYSTAL SAID THAT THE SKULL WAS BROUGHT IN THE MAIN ROOM AND 
PLACED ONTO THE TOP OF THE TELEVISION. THEN I T WAS REPACKAGED 
AND PUT AWAY. WHAT DOES PUT AWAY MEAN WITHIN THE CONTENTS OF 
— I MEAN, THAT SOUNDS LIKE I T ' S STORED TO ME. 
MR. WILLIAMS: WELL, YOUR HONOR, WHEN YOU SAY "PUT 
AWAY," I THINK I T DEPENDS ON THE CONTEXT OF WHAT WE ARE 
TALKING ABOUT. I F DALLAS ROWLEY LIVED AT THE RESIDENCE, PUT 
AWAY CERTAINLY WOULD IMPLY BEING PUT THERE FOR STORAGE. 
THE COURT: DO YOU THINK THAT "PUT AWAY" IMPLIES 
KEPT ON SOMEBODY'S PERSON AND TAKEN WITH THEM? 
MR. WILLIAMS: YOUR HONOR, I THINK I T IMPLIES BEING 
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PUT OUT OF SIGHT, • BEING PACKAGED, OF BEING PUT OUT OF THE 
SIGHT, OUT OF THE VIEW OF THE PERSON WHO WAS OBSERVING IT 
UNDER THESE KINDS OF CIRCUMSTANCES. IF I AM VISITING MY, SAY 
Mi' IJIFi I'" ,'•' Hi IMF AMI i I BMNh OUT SOMETHING THAT I WANT TO SHOW 
THEM, I SHOW IT TO THEM, THEY SAY, THIS IS NEAT, THIS IS GREAT 
STUFF, BUT I AM GOING TO PUT IT AWAY NOW, DOES THAT MEAN I 
HAVE AN INTENT TO STORE IT ON THAT PREMISES DON'T THINK 
SO. NO. IT MEANS IT'S NO LONGER THE CENTER OF ATTENTION, I 
PACKAGED IT UP. I HAVE TAKEN, PUT IT WAY, THEN WHEN I LEAVE 
IT'S MY PERSONAL PROPERTY AND I TAKE IT WITH ME. 
THE COURT: WOULDN'T AN ALTERNATIVE, JUST AS 
LIKELY, INTERPRETATION OF THAT PHRASE BE TO PUT IT WHERE IT IS 
KEPT, TO PUT BACK IN PLACE, THAT KIND OF CONCEPT? 
MR. WILLIAMS: I DON'T THINK THAT EVEN COMES CLOSE 
WITHOUT HAVING SOME CONTEXT TO DEAL WITH. AND THAT'S WHY THE 
CRITICAL OMISSION. AND THIS IS WHAT YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT 
EARLIER. THERE WAS SOMETHING MENTIONED ABOUT A LINDA JACOBS 
RESIDENCE. AND THERE WAS SOMETHING MENTIONED ABOUT A BETH 
SMUIN RESIDENCE. THERE WAS NEVER ANY DISTINGUISHING WHO LIVES 
WITH WHOM WHEN, IN FACT, POLICE KNEW THAT HE LIVED WITH LINDA 
JACOBS. 
THE COURT: THE»^ Tc BECAUSE IN THE AFFIDAVIT IT 
TALKS SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE INTERVIEW TAKING PLACE. AND THEY 
ASK — '. tNTERVIEW TOOK PLACE AT THE JACOBS RESIDENCE. AND 
THEY ASK WHERE THE SMUIN RESIDENCE WAS. AND THEY SAID IT WAS 
PB\ 
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DOWN THE STREET. ISN'T THAT THERE ALSO? 
MR. WILLIAMS: THAT MIGHT BE IN — IS THAT IN 5(B)? 
I DON'T HAVE IT RIGHT IN FRONT OF ME. 
MR. WALLENTINE: 5(B). IN A TRAILER, ON A CORNER, 
UP FROM A HOUSE. 
MR. WILLIAMS: BUT WHAT I AM SAYING IS, YOU SAY WE 
MENTIONED TWO RESIDENCES. BUT THE ACTUAL POSSESSION IS 
ATTRIBUTED TO DALLAS ROWLEY. AND WHERE HE RESIDES NEVER WAS 
STATED IN THE AFFIDAVIT. AND THAT'S WHY IT'S CONFUSING. 
THAT'S WHY IN THE CONTEXT THAT IT WAS PRESENTED, YES, PUT 
AWAY, IF DALLAS ROWLEY RESIDED AT THE BETH SMUIN RESIDENCE, 
PUT AWAY, A FAIR IMPLICATION OF THAT COULD BE PUT IT BACK TO 
WHERE IT'S STORED. BUT IF A PERSON DOESN'T RESIDE AT A PLACE 
THE COURT: PUT AWAY MEANS SOMETHING DIFFERENT^ 
MR. WILLIAMS: PUTTING AWAY, I DON'T THINK, MEANS, 
HAS ANY IMPLICATION, WHATSOEVER, OF BEING RETURNED TO THE 
PLACE WHERE IT CAME FROM. I PUT AWAY THINGS ALL THE TIME WHEN 
I AM AT MY HOME, AT MY — I THINK OF GOING TO MY PARENTS' 
HOME, WHICH I DO FREQUENTLY. YOU KNOW, I TAKE THINGS THERE. 
I HAVE THEM. WHEN IT IS TIME TO PUT THEM AWAY, GET THEM OUT 
OF SIGHT, THEY ARE NO LONGER USEFUL. IT MEANS FIRST PUT THEM 
TO THE PLACE WHERE THEY ARE TEMPORARILY HELD, WHICH IS 
PROBABLY THE ROOM THAT I AM GOING TO BE IN. THEN AS SOON AS I 
LEAVE IT MEANS TAKING THEM BACK TO MY HOME. AND THAT IS NOT 
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1 ' TORTURING THE LANGUAGE. 
2 AGAIN, THAT'S WHY T POINT OUT THE OMISSION, THE 
IMPLICATION IS STILL THERE THAT HE HAD PROPERTY THERE. THAT 
HE LIVED THERE. HE STORED IT THERE. BUT THERE IS — AND 
THAT'S AN IMPLICATION WHICH THE POLICE KNEW ' BE, rALSE. HE 
HERE. HE DIDN'T STORE THINGS THERE. AT LEAST 
7 THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF IT. AND IT STILL DOESN'T REALLY 
8 J ADDRESS. IT ONLY CONTRIBUTES. IT STILL DOESN'T ADDRESS THE 
ISSUE. IF I HAVE INFORMATION THAT A BASKETBALL IS KEPT AT 
10 LYNN PAYNE'S HOUSE, WAS SEEN AT LYNN PAYNE'S HOUSE FIVE WEEKS 
11 AGO, AND IT IS YOUR HOUSE, AND I KNOW IT'S YOUR HOUSE AND, 
12 FIVE WEEKS LATER IS IT PROBABLE CAUSE THAT IT IS STILL THERE? 
13 THERE IS SOME INDICATIONS, I SUPPOSE. 
14 THE COURT: IF WE DIDN'T HAVE THAT ONE DESCRIPTIVE 
15 PHRASE, "PUT AWAY." I WOULD AGREE WITH EVERYTHING YOU HAVE 
16 SAID. BUT I THINK THAT A FAIR READING OF THAT TO A MAGISTRATE 
17 IS THAT IT WAS PUT BACK IN HER PRESENCE, IT WAS PUT BACK TO 
18 WHERE IT WAS GOING TO BE. I THINK THE MAGISTRATE WAS ENTITLED 
19 TO READ IT THAT WAY. AND TO SUGGEST THAT THE ONLY PROPERTY 
20 THAT PEOPLE EVER POSSESS 1 ROPERTY THA'I THE\ KhM' MI THEIR 
21 I HOUSE IGNORES THE REALITY • «=". I HAVE STORED MY 
22 CHILDREN'S THINGS FOR YEARS, ALTHOUGH THEY LIVE SOME PLACE 
23 ELSE AND ARE MARRIED. THINGS VARIOUS TIMES IN 
24 MY LIFE AT SOMEBODY'S PROPERTY, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE MINE. AND 
25 TO SAY THAT IT ONLY MEANS PUT AWAY IF YOU LIVE THERE, ONLY 
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MEANS — IT MEANS SOMETHING DIFFERENT THAN IF YOU DON'T LIVE 
THERE, I THINK. 
MR. WILLIAMS: BUT IT STILL DOESN'T ADDRESS — EVEN 
IF YOU TAKE IT THAT WAY, YOUR HONOR, AND SAY THAT A MAGISTRATE 
COULD READ IT THAT WAY, IF HE DOES READ IT THAT WAY, HE IS 
READING AN INTERPRETATION INTO IT THAT THE OFFICER KNEW TO BE 
FALSE. THE OFFICER KNEW THAT HE DIDN'T LIVE THERE. AND THERE 
WAS NO IMPLICATION THAT HE DID ANY STORAGE. 
THE COURT: THE RECORD WOULD INDICATE THAT THE 
OFFICER DID NOT KNOW THAT IT WAS PUT AWAY AT THAT RESIDENCE. 
IN FACT, HE TESTIFIED THAT THAT'S WHAT HE WAS TOLD, IT WAS PUT 
AWAY. AND YOU ASKED HIM THAT SPECIFIC QUESTION. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I'M NOT SURE THAT HE ACTUALLY EVER 
DID TESTIFY THAT THAT'S WHAT HE WAS TOLD. HE TESTIFIED THAT 
THAT'S WHAT HE PUT IN THE WARRANT. 
THE COURT: WOULD YOU GET MY NOTES THAT ARE IN ON 
MY DESK. THE FILES TOO. 
MR. WILLIAMS: WHAT HE ACTUALLY HEARD AND WHAT HE 
ACTUALLY PUT IN THE WARRANT, I DON'T BELIEVE WE HAVE ANY 
OFFICIAL RECORD. BUT I DON'T BELIEVE WE HAVE A FIRM RECORD 
THAT THOSE WERE THE EXACT WORDS THAT SHE USED. THOSE ARE THE 
WORDS THAT HE USED. AND — 
THE COURT: WELL, I WAS TRYING TO PAY PRETTY CLOSE 
ATTENTION TO THAT ISSUE BECAUSE, AS I READ THE AFFIDAVIT, AND 
IN THE PROCESS OF YOUR QUESTIONING OF THE WITNESS IN THIS » 
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CASE, I MADE A NOTATION OF WHAT WAS SAID THAT I THOUGHT WAS 
PRETTY CONTROLLING. I'LL CHECK MY NOTES. 
ASKED INFORMATION OTHER THAN 
WHAT CRYSTAL JACOBS SAID. AND HE HAD SAID HE HAD NO 
INFORMATION OTHER THAN WHAT CRYSTAL JACOBS SAI* ' ou WERE 
REFERRING TO THE LANGUAGE IN THE AFFIDAVIT. 1 . ~~r AND 
SO I TOOK THAT AS AN INDICATION THAT CRYSTAL JACOBS HAD TOLD 
HIM WHAT HE PLACED IN THE AFFIDAVIT. AND, IN FACT, I THINK 
THAT'S WHAT THE AFFIDAVIT ITSELF SAYS, IS THAT SHE SAYS, "THE 
SKULL WAS BROUGHT IN THE MAIN RADIO ROOM, PLACED ON THE TOP OF 
THE TELEVISION, THEN IT WAS PACKAGED AND PUT AWAY." THAT'S 
WHAT THE AFFIDAVIT SAYS. 
MR. WILLIAMS: IT'S A SUMMARY. IT'S NOT A VERBATIM 
QUOTE. I AM REMINDED, YOUR HONOR — VERYTHING 
POSSIBLE TO AVOID THE 0. J. TRIAL ~ ... T 1 AM REMINDED OF AN 
INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED EARLY ON IN THE VERY PRELIMINARY 
HEARING WHERE MR. SHAPIRO HAD A CELLULAR PHONE SITT- ; 
COURT. AND IT RANG. AND JUDGE ITO SAID, PUT THAT PHONE AWAY. 
IF IT HAPPENS AGAIN, IT'S MINE. THAT'S THE CONTEXT, THAT IS 
THE NORMAL READING. DOES THAT MEAN THAT HK STuPHM HIS 
CELLULAR PHONE AT THE CpURTROOM? 
THE COURT: NO. I THINK IT SAYS WHEN YOU PUT IT 
AWAY YOU rui' IT BACK TO WHERE IT BELONGS. frr 
SOMETHING AWAY WITHIN THE CONTENTS OF WHAT SHE SAYS, ' "' 
KNOW THAT IT'S UNREASONABLE FOR JUDGE ANDERSON TO TAKE THAT AS 
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BEING PUT IT BACK TO WHERE IT WAS STORED AND IT WAS STORED 
THERE ON THE PREMISES. 
MR. WILLIAMS: AND I THINK THAT IS A TORTURED, 
STRETCHED OUT INTERPRETATION WHICH GOES FAR BEYOND GIVING ANY 
DEFERENCE. IT GOES TO THE ABSOLUTE BENDING OVER BACKWARDS, 
BECAUSE A COMMON SENSE READING SAYS, PUT IT BACK TO WHERE — 
PUT IT AWAY, "AWAY" MEANS AWAY FROM THIS LOCATION ON ITS FACE. 
THE COURT: IT ALSO HAS A MEANING IN OUR SOCIETY 
OF ~ 
MR. WILLIAMS: AND IT WAS NOT FOUND THERE, WHICH I 
HAVE ARGUED. WHAT THEY DID OR DID NOT FIND HAS NO RELEVANCE 
BEFORE. AND YOU STATED WHAT THEY DID OR DIDN'T FIND DID HAVE 
RELEVANCE. THIS WAS NOT FOUND THERE. THERE WAS NO 
INDICATIONS IN THE WARRANT THAT IT WAS EVER FOUND THERE. 
THE COURT: WELL, WHETHER IT WAS EVER FOUND THERE 
HAS NO RELEVANCE AS TO WHETHER THE WARRANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
ISSUED. OTHERWISE, THE POLICE OFFICER WOULD BE BOOTSTRAPPING 
THAT STUFF ALL THE TIME. THEY WOULD FIND STUFF THERE AND SAY 
THE WARRANT'S GOOD. WE HAVE PROVED IT. IT WAS THERE. 
MR. WILLIAMS: AGAIN, I POINT OUT, YOUR HONOR, THE 
CRITICAL OMISSION, CONCRETE KNOWLEDGE THAT HE WAS NOT THERE IS 
THE ONLY — GIVES US THE ONLY BASIS'UPON WHICH EVEN A TORTURED 
INTERPRETATION OF "PUT AWAY" THAT JUDGE ANDERSON COULD HAVE 
CONCLUDED THAT THAT WAS THE PLACE IT WAS STILL LIKELY TO BE. 
IF IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT LIVE THERE, THAT HE 
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WAS A VISITOR, WHICH IS THE INDICATIONS WE HAVE, THEN THE ONLY 
COMMON SENSE READING OF IT, WHICH IS WHAT WE ASK OUT OF A 
H AT? T f'-Th ATh , I' i nMll i|| -A'USV, ,J!Uir,MFlJI I I M M II W 'I ^ KEN OUT 
AWAY FROM THE PRESENCE OF THE OBSERVER. 
THE COURT: WELL, IN FACT, JUDGE ANDERSON DID KNOW 
I'ROM THE TESTIMONY (>K OFFICER NORTON. 
MR. WILLIAMS: NOT ON THE FACE OF THE WARRANT. 
THE COURT: NOT ON THE FACE OF THE WARRANT. SEE, 
LAIMING BOTH WAYS. YOU CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. 
MR. WILLIAMS: WELL, YOUR HONOR, AND PERHAPS WE HAD 
NO INFORMATION OF THAT. WE NOW HAVE A SITUATION WHERE WE MAY 
HAVE A SEPARATE GROUNDS FOR SUPPRESSION OF THE MAGISTRATE 
CONSIDERING INFORMATION THAT WAS NOT ON THE AFFIDAVIT. WE 
HAVE NO INDICATIONS OF THAT PRIOR TO TODAY. 
THE COURT: WELL, I WILLING TO TAKE IT ON BOTH 
BASES AT THIS TIME. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I THINK I PRETTY MUCH EXHAUSTED TO 
WHAT I HAD TO SAY EXCEPT RESPONDING TO YOUR QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU FOR DOING SO. 
MR. WILLIAMS: BUT, YOUR HONOR, I JUST REITERATE, 
III II 
THE COURT: MR. WALLENTINE. 
MR. WALLENTINE: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE HERE THE 
COURT'S FILE IN THE STANLEY MATTER. AND IF YOU WOULD LIKE, I 




RESOLVED IN YOUR MIND — 
THE COURT: IT'S RESOLVED IN MY MIND, BECAUSE IN 
THE STANLEY MATTER I THINK I HAVE STATED MY UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE STANLEY MATTER. IF I AM INCORRECT, IF MY RECOLLECTION --
I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD — 
MR. WALLENTINE: YOU ARE NOT ONLY CORRECT, YOUR 
HONOR, BUT THE AFFIDAVIT IN THIS CASE IN THE STANLEY MATTER 
IS, FRANKLY, FATALLY FRAUD. THERE IS NO CONNECTION WHATSOEVER 
OF THE DEFENDANT TO THE LOCATION TO THE CRIMINAL ACTS THAT 
OCCURRED. 
THE COURT: WE SHOULDN'T USE THE WORD "DEFENDANT." 
WE NEED TO SAY THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PROBABLE 
CAUSE AND THE PLACE WHERE THE SEARCH WAS TO BE COMMENCED. AND 
THERE NEEDS TO BE PROBABLE CAUSE IF THE ITEMS WERE THERE. 
MR. WALLENTINE: RIGHT. AND THE AFFIDAVIT IS JUST 
FRAUD IN THAT EFFECT. ANYWAY, THE FILE IS HERE AND AVAILABLE 
FOR THE COURT IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO TAKE A LOOK AT IT. 
YOUR HONOR, FIRST I WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY ADDRESS 
THE STANDARD THAT THE COURT OUGHT TO BE LOOKING AT SINCE 
THAT'S BEEN RAISED. I THINK MR. WILLIAMS IS ESSENTIALLY 
CORRECT IN HIS REPRESENTATION OF THE HORTON CASE. THAT SAYS 
THAT TRIAL COURT JUDGE IN REVIEWING THESE ISSUES OUGHT NOT TO 
ENGAGE IN JUDICIAL CONTORTIONS. BUT THAT'S REALLY ALL IT 
SAYS, JUDGE. 
I THINK THE CONTROLLING STANDARD OF REVIEW, IF YOU 
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WILL, IS SET FORTH IN STATE VERSUS WEAVER, WHICH IS A CASE WE 
RELY HEAVILY • . ntnTE.Ii STATES VERSUS LEON, THAT SIMPLY SAYS 
THAT JUDGES OUGHT TO BE ACTING WITH COMMON SENSE, PRACTICAL 
MANNER. AND THEY OUGHT TO LOOK AT WARRANT SUFFICIENCY, 
AFFIDAV JFFICIENCY IN THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCE. 
A"'i IF THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY THERE, STATE VERSUS CALLER TELLS 
Us, WELL, YOU ARE TO RESOLVE THAT AMBIGUITY OR IT'S CERTAINLY 
WITHIN YOUR DISCRETION TO RESOLVE ANY AMBIGUITY IN FAVOR OF 
THE STATE. WE ARE ONLY HERE, JUDGE, TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE 
AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHES A FAIR PROBABILITY OF FINDING EVIDENCE 
IN THE PLACE NAMED BY THE WARRANT. I THINK THAT JURIS 
PRUDENCE IS CLEAR. I WOULD REFER THE COURT TO UNITED STATES 
VERSUS VEN STRASKA. I BELIEVE IT'S A 1965 SUPREME COURT CASE 
WHERE I BELIEVE THE EXACT LANGUAGE OF THE SUPREME COURT WAS, 
IF YOU HAVE A DOUBTFUL OR MARGINAL CASE WHERE THERE IS 
PROBABLE — QUESTION OF PROBABLE CAUSE, IT OUGHT TO BE 
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE STATE. THE UNDERLYING POLICY THERE 
IS WE WANT POLICE OFFICERS TO GO TO MAGISTRATES. WE WANT THEM 
TO GET SEARCH WARRANTS. AND IT'S GOING TO PROMOTE THAT POLICY 
<»b' GETTING SEARCH WARRANTS IF WE ' "P THE SCALES WHEN THE 
AMBIGUITY IS IN FAVOR OF THE STATE. I AM NOT CONCEDING A 
FATAL AMBIGUITY. AM NOT SURE THERE IS. AND I WILL VISIT 
THAT IN JUST A MOMENT. 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION WITH RESPECT TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE ARE IDENTICAL. 
PS0! 
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AND THE ISSUES AS TO PARTICULARITY THERE, YOUR HONOR, ARE 
PARTICULARITY AS TO THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE TO BE 
SEARCHED AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE OBJECT OR PERSON TO BE 
SEIZED. THE REAL TEST IS, CAN AN OFFICER TAKE THIS WARRANT IN 
HAND, FIND THE LOCATION, DRIVE DOWN THE STREET AND SAY, WELL, 
THERE IT IS, THAT'S WHAT'S DESCRIBED ON THE FACE OF THE 
WARRANT? THERE IS SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY THERE DESCRIBING 
THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED, AND ONCE ENTERING THAT PLACE TO BE 
SEARCHED DOES THE OFFICER HAVE TO SIT AND MAKE REASONED 
JUDGMENTS AS TO WHAT CAN OR CANNOT BE SEIZED IF THE WARRANT 
ADEQUATELY DESCRIBES WHAT OUGHT TO BE SEIZED, THEN THE 
PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO THAT IS MET. 
THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT, YOUR HONOR, THAT AN 
AFFIDAVIT OR SEARCH WARRANT CONNECT UP A PARTICULAR DEFENDANT 
WITH A PARTICULAR LOCATION, NOT ONLY NOT IN THE CAPTION WHICH 
I THINK WE ALL UNDERSTAND. I WOULD DRAW YOUR ATTENTION, YOUR 
HONOR, TO THE WEAVER CASE, CASE DECIDED IN 1991. IT WAS 
ARGUED, I THINK IN JULY, BUT DECIDED IN THE FALL OF 1991 WHERE 
THE DEFENDANT CHALLENGED THE WARRANT THAT WAS ISSUED TO SEARCH 
ANOTHER RESIDENCE. IT WAS HIS MOTHER'S RESIDENCE. AND HE 
SAID, WAIT A MINUTE. THE STATE DID NOT OBVIATE THE 
POSSIBILITY OF TRIPS INTO MY MOTHER'S HOUSE. PEOPLE GO VISIT 
THEIR PARENTS. MR. WILLIAMS TELLS US AND PEOPLE HAVE A 
LEGITIMATE REASON TO GO INTO THEIR PARENTS' HOUSE. DEFENDANTS 




WAS NAMED IN THE WARRANT HERE. AND IT'S CONTAINED IN THE 
WARRANT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WAS ON PROBATION. AND THE COURT 
•"AIR TO MAKE THE ASSUMPTION THAT 
SOMEBODY'S ON PROBATION AND IS IN POSSESSION OF CONTRABAND*, 
„ , UNLAWFUL GOODS, THEY ARE NOT GOING TO STORE THEM IN THEIR OWN 
6 ' ARE GOIN; i STORE THEM SOME PLACE ELSE. I AM NOT 
RAISING THAT AS AN ISSUE HERE, MERELY TO POINT OUT TO THE 
« I COURT THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS MAKE QUICK WORK OF THE 
9 ARGUMENT. THERE IS JUST NO REQUIREMENT THAT THE STATE COME IN 
10 AND SAY, OKAY, HERE'S THE NEXUS BETWEEN THIS INDIVIDUAL AND 
11 BETWEEN THIS PIECE OF PROPERTY. ALL THE STATE NEEDS TO DO, 
12 YOUR HONOR, IS ESTABLISH A FAIR PROBABILITY THAT THERE ARE 
13 FRUITS OF A CRIME, CONTRABAND, OR EVIDENCE OF A CRIME 
14 CONTAINED IN A PARTICULAR LOCATION, AND THAT'S WHAT WE ARE 
HERE TO LOOK AT TODAY. 
16 NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THE STALENESS ISSUE, I THINK 
xi THAT ANY CASES THAT I COULD CITE TO THE COURT DISCUSSING 
18 STALENESS WOULD SIMPLY TEACH THE COURT THAT THERE IS A 
19 TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF DISCUSSION IN THE REPORTED CASES ABOUT 
20 STALENESS. THERE JUST IS NO BRIGHT LINE TEST. THERE 
21 TWO WEEK, THREE WEEK, SEVERAL WEEK, THREE MONTH ISSUE AS TO 
22 STALENESS. 
23 WE OUGHT " • HOWEVER, ONE OF THE I /^ 'TORS THAT 
24 THE COURTS HAVE LOOKED AT IS, WHAT ARE WE LOOKING FOR? WE ARE 
25 NOT LOOKING FOR A BASKETBALL. WE ARE NOT LOOKING FOR A DRUG 
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PIPE. WE ARE NOT LOOKING FOR A QUANTITY OF METHAMPHETAMINE OR 
SOME UNTAXED LIQUOR THAT IS LIKELY TO BE CONSUMED OR MOVED 
ABOUT. YOUR HONOR, THE COMMODITY, IF YOU WILL, THAT'S AT 
ISSUE IN THIS SEARCH WARRANT IS A HUMAN SKULL. THAT IS NOT A 
COMMODITY THAT IS EASILY DISPOSED OF. IT'S NOT TRADED ON THE 
MARKET. IT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT'S CONSUMED. IT'S SOMETHING 
THAT A MAGISTRATE CAN LOOK AT AND SAY, WELL, THAT'S NOT 
SOMETHING LIKE A DRUG PIPE THAT IS HERE TODAY, GONE TOMORROW. 
IT DOESN'T TRAVEL AROUND WITH A USER OF DRUGS. 
THE COURT: WELL, BUT IT IS EASILY MOVED. 
MR. WALLENTINE: IT IS EASILY MOVED. THERE IS NO 
DOUBT ABOUT THAT. EVEN IF IT'S PACKAGED UP AND PUT IN SOME 
SORT OF SUITCASE IT IS EASILY MOVED. 
THE COURT: AND, IF I DIDN'T HAVE THIS "PUT AWAY" 
LANGUAGE, DO YOU THINK IF IT WAS JUST OBSERVED IN THE HOUSE 
WHERE SOMEBODY DID NOT RESIDE, THAT AFTER THE PASSAGE OF 
SIGNIFICANT TIME, SEVERAL WEEKS, IT WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT? 
MR. WALLENTINE: THEN YOU WOULD HEAR ME ARGUING 
VERY LOUDLY JUDGE, GOOD FAITH. BUT YOU ARE NOT HEARING ME 
ARGUE THAT. I GUESS WHILE I AM AT THAT ISSUE I MIGHT AS WELL 
ARGUE IT NOW. AS WE PROCEEDED THROUGH PARAGRAPH 5(B) AND YOU 
TRY TO PLACE YOURSELF IN THE SHOES THAT THE MAGISTRATE WHO 
ISSUED THIS WARRANT — I DON'T THINK YOU HAVE TO TORTURE THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE — I THINK IT'S REAL PLAIN WHAT HAPPENED 
HERE. YOU HAVE A REAL RELIABLE INFORMANT, EIGHT YEARS OLD, 
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MAY NOT HAVE A GOOD CONCEPT OF TIME, BUT YOU HAVE A LITTLE 
GIRL HERE WHO SAYS, HEY, I WENT TO THIS HOUSE AS A VISITOR. 
WHILE I WAS IN THAT HOUSE, SOMEONE RETRIEVED ~ SOMEONE WENT 
AND GOT SOMETHING AND BROUGHT IT INTO THE LIVING ROOM, 
UNPACKAGED IT, SHOWED IT TO Ml' FAiFAGEIi 11 Bftfl in AND THEN 
t>TJT IT AWAY. NOW, I THINK THAT THE PLAIN AND VARY IMPORT OF 
THAT LANGUAGE IS YOU HAVE SOMETHING SITTING ON THE SHELF IN A 
LOSET PULL THE KITCHEN ' •• EVERYBODY IS 
DONE OOHING AND AHHING AND WONDERING OVER THE FACT WHETHER 
THIS IS A HUMAN SKULL PUT ON THE KITCHEN TABLE, IT'S PUT BACK 
RIGHT WHERE IT CAME FROM ON THE SHELF IN THE CLOSET. 
THE COURT: THE LANGUAGE DOESN'T SUGGEST THAT'S 
WHERE THIS CAME FROM. THE LANGUAGE JUST SAID 
MR. WALLENTINE: I THINK IT DOES, JUDGE. 
THE COURT: IT WAS BROUGHT INTO THE LIVING ROOM. 
IT DOESN'T SAY IT WAS RETRIEVED OR TAKEN FROM ITS PLACE. 
MR. WALLENTINE: NO, IT DOES NOT. BUT I THINK THE 
FAIR IMPORT WAS, IT WAS BROUGHT BY SOMEONE ELSE AND PUT ON THE 
FOCAL POINT OF THE ROOM. 
THE COURT' 'THAT rOI.Jl.,1.) HAVR BEEN A < Ah1 i >P Di'WN THE 
STREET. 
MP WALLENTINE: WELL, COULD HAVE BEEN. 
THE nilJR'l'. W'.i I'lA'ibK 'IH/il AN AMBIGUITY. AND 
IF IT IS, YOUR HONOR, I WOULD SUGGEST TO YOU THAT BOTH THE 




AN AMBIGUITY IN FAVOR OF THE FAIR READING THAT THE ISSUING 
MAGISTRATE GAVE TO A WARRANT. 
NOW, COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE HAS POINTED OUT THAT WE DO 
NOT HAVE A PRECISE MEASUREMENT OF WHEN THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED 
AS IT RELATES TO THE DATE THAT THE AFFIDAVIT WAS COMPLETED AND 
WAS SWORN TO. WE DO SEE THAT THE OFFICER WAS VERY DILIGENT IN 
ACTING UPON THE INFORMATION. THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THAT 
THERE WAS ANY DILATORY CONDUCT THERE. AND THE OFFICER DID 
WHAT HE COULD. THE OFFICER DID WHAT HE COULD TO CORROBORATE 
THAT INFORMATION. HE WENT TO SOME OTHER FOLKS. I REFER YOU 
TO PARAGRAPH 5(E). WE WENT TO THE GRANDMOTHER, MRS. BEVERLY 
JACOBS, AND FOUND OUT THAT YES, ANOTHER PERSON STATED THAT SHE 
HAD ALSO SEEN A HUMAN SKULL. AND NOT IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT 
PAST. AGAIN, WE DON'T HAVE AN EXACT DAY. IT SAYS, NOT LONG 
AGO. BUT HE'S MADE AN EFFORT THERE. 
NOW, WITH RESPECT, YOUR HONOR, TO THE GOOD FAITH 
EXCEPTION, I'M NOT GOING TO BELABOR THAT. I THINK YOU CAN 
DEAL WITH THAT HAVING RECENTLY READ ROWE. BUT MR. WILLIAMS IS 
CORRECT, THE REAL QUESTION HERE IS OBJECTIVE RELIANCE. AND I 
WOULD SUGGEST TO YOU THAT PERHAPS THE BEST EVIDENCE OF 
OBJECTIVE RELIANCE IS THAT THIS OFFICER TOOK AN AFFIDAVIT FOR 
A SEARCH WARRANT TO A MAGISTRATE WHO GAVE IT A FAIR READING, 
AND I'M TELLING THE COURT THAT I THINK THAT YOU OUGHT NOT TO 
DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN ASSUME THAT THE MAGISTRATE WHO ISSUED 




CTED ON PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE WARRANT. AND THAT OFFICER, I 
THINK, ACTED FAIRLY. I SIMPLY DON'T SEE THE INTENTIONAL 
OMISSION THAT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED. AND I'LL TELL YOU I THINK 
JGGESTED WITHOUT ANY REAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THIS 
COURT. THE WARRANT TELLS US THERE IS TWO RESIDENCES. IT 
TELLS US THAT THIS INTERVIEW HAPPENED ONE PLACE. AND THE KID, 
THINK ' ACTUALLY SAYS - ' DOESN'T SAY SHE 
POINTED DOWN THE STREET. SHE DESCRIBED THIS OTHER HOUSE. 
THIS TRAILER THAT'S DOWN THE STREET. IT'S IN YOUR 
NEIGHBORHOOD. BUT SHE SAID, YES, THIS IS WHERE IT HAPPENED. 
BUT WE ARE HERE. AND THIS IS WHERE DALLAS ROWLEY LIVES. IT 
HAPPENED SOMEWHERE ELSE. 
AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, WOULD URGE THE COURT THAT WHAT 
WE HAVE HERE IS A SITUATION WHERE THE AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED A 
FAIR PROBABILITY THAT A HUMAN SKULL WOULD BE FOUND AT THE 
LOCATION WHICH WAS PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED. THERE IS NO 
CHALLENGE AS TO THAT. AND THAT THE ITEM TO BE SEIZED WAS 
DESCRIBED WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY TO UPHOLD THE WARRANT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. MR. BEASLIN? ANYTHING FROM 
EITHER OF YOU? 
MR. BEASLIN: NO. 
THE COURT: MR. WILLIAMS? 
MR. WILLIAMS: YOUR HONOR r DON'T KNOW. I GUESS I 
TRY AND LOOK AT COMMON SENSE. TGNED hU AFFTDAVn THAT 




WHILE I WAS THERE I SAW DEANNE MILLECAM, WHO I KNOW DOESN'T 
LIVE THERE, AND SHE BROUGHT OUT AND SHOWED ME ONE OF HER ART 
THINGS THAT SHE DOES, WHICH IS A HUMAN SCULPTURE, AND THEN SHE 
PUT IT AWAY, IS THAT PROBABLE CAUSE THAT SEVERAL WEEKS LATER 
THAT IS STILL AT LYNN PAYNE'S HOUSE? AND I SUBMIT THERE IS NO 
REASONABLE CONSTRUCTION WHEN IT'S OBVIOUSLY A VISITOR, IT'S 
OBVIOUSLY A SOCIAL TYPE GATHERING, THAT THAT WOULD RAISE ANY 
IMPLICATION WHATSOEVER THAT IT WOULD BE STORED. COMMON SENSE 
SAYS NO. IT'S THE KIND OF THING YOU BRING OUT AND SHOW, THEN 
YOU TAKE IT WHERE IT GOES. 
THE COURT: TWO WAYS I CAN LOOK AT THIS. ONE IS TO 
GIVE THE OFFICER'S STATEMENT THAT HE TOLD THE MAGISTRATE 
INFORMATION NOT CONTAINED IN THE WARRANT AND THAT WAS 
REQUESTED BY THE MAGISTRATE IN MAKING THE DETERMINATION. I 
THINK THAT THAT'S A STRONGER CASE FOR THE STATE, ACTUALLY, 
BECAUSE IN THAT CASE THE MAGISTRATE WOULD HAVE HAD ACTUAL^ 
KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON HAD LIVED THERE AND WOULD HAVE 
ISSUED THE SEARCH WARRANT. I THINK, REALLY, WHAT I AM 
SUPPOSED TO DO IN THIS CASE IS TO CONSIDER THE AFFIDAVIT AND 
THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE AFFIDAVIT AND THE SEARCH WARRANT 
WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO WHAT THE CONVERSATION MAY HAVE BEEN 
BETWEEN THE MAGISTRATE AND THE OFFICER. AND THE REASON I 
THINK THAT THAT'S AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD TO USE IN MOST CASES 
IS, OTHERWISE, YOU HAVE ALL TYPES OF INFORMATION THAT IS GIVEN 




1 AND I THINK THAT THAT'S THE REASON THAT THE BURDEN IS UPON THE 
2 DEFENDANT ONCE THE WARRANT HAS BEEN OBTAINED, IS TO ENCOURAGE 
3 POLICE OFFICERS TO COME IN, WRITE THINGS DOWN AND SUBMIT THEM 
4 TO MAGISTRATES WHO HAVE DECISIONS MADE WHICH CAN BE REVIEWED. 
5 AND I BELIEVE IN DOING THAT. I HAVE TO GIVE IT SOME 
6 REASONABLE DEFERENCE NTERPRETAT11 iM THAT 'IMF ,JUri("iF WIM 
7 ISSUED THE CITATION GAVE AS IS A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION. 
8 IT'S TRUE THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE WARRANT 
y ITSELF WHICH TALKS ABOUT WHERE THE INDIVIDUAL WHO IS THE 
10 SUBJECT OF THIS INVESTIGATION, MR. DALLAS ROWLEY, LIVED. 
11 THERE IS AN INDICATION THAT ITEMS HAD BEEN SEEN AT TWO 
12 RESIDENCES. ONE DON JACOBS, OR RATHER NOT DON JACOBS, BUT HIS 
13 FORMER WIFE LINDA JACOBS' RESIDENCE, AND A SEPARATE RESIDENCE. 
14 I THINK A FAIR READING OF THE AFFIDAVIT WOULD INDICATE THAT 
THERE ARE TWO, INCLUDING HER STATEMENT, THE CHILD'S 
16 STATEMENT, LINDA JACOBS' DAUGHTER'S STATEMENT ABOUT WHERE THE 
17 SMUIN RESIDENCE WAS IN RELATION TO HER RESIDENCE. I THINK 
18 IT'S CLEAR THERE ARE TWO. 
19 THE REAL ISSUE IN THIS CASE, TWO ISSUES, ARE 
20 WHETHER OR NOT THE POLICE OFFICERS DID ANYTHING IN BAD FAITH 
.', ' I IN I'ROCURRlN'i 'MM W M< K AN I , I tifl>' NOTHING ON THE RECORD THAT 
22 I INDICATES THAT THEY DID. NO INDICATION THAT THEY CONSCIOUSLY 
23 MISLEAD THE MAGISTRATE OR THAT THEY ATTEMPTED TO PUT 
2 4 I I I H I H M M M HI III W H I C H 'llll'i' FNI'W Nnl In Bh 'I'KtJfcJ. WH.- H A V E 
25 IS INFORMATION THAT WAS MERELY NOT PLACED IN THE AFFIDAVIT. 
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AND I DON'T THINK THAT THERE WAS ANY BAD FAITH AT ALL IN THE 
OFFICER'S PRESENTATION OF THIS MATTER TO THE MAGISTRATE. AND 
I COME DOWN TO THE LANGUAGE THAT I REFER TO A COUPLE TIMES. 
LAST PART OF THAT — WELL, I'LL READ THE ENTIRE STATEMENT. 
"CRYSTAL SAID THE SKULL WAS BROUGHT IN THE ROOM AND PLACED ON 
THE TOP OF THE TELEVISION. THEN IT WAS REPACKAGED AND PUT 
AWAY." 
NOW, I AGREE WITH MR. WILLIAMS THAT IT MAY BE THAT 
THAT LANGUAGE IS SUBJECT TO OTHER INTERPRETATIONS. BUT I 
THINK THAT THE INTERPRETATION THAT JUDGE ANDERSON MAY HAVE 
GIVEN THAT, APPARENTLY DID GIVE THAT, IS ALSO A REASONABLE 
INTERPRETATION, THAT IT WAS PUT AWAY SOMEWHERE ON THE PREMISES 
THAT WERE SEARCHED. 
THIS ISN'T THE TYPE OF ITEM THAT IS LIKELY TO BE 
KEPT ON SOMEBODY'S PERSON. A HUMAN SKULL. IT'S NOT COMMON 
FOR PEOPLE TO CARRY AROUND ALL THE TIME HUMAN SKULLS. 
THEREFORE, IT'S THE TYPE OF ITEM THAT NEEDS TO BE KEPT 
SOMEPLACE. AND THE LANGUAGE IN THE AFFIDAVIT, AND I THINK 
IT'S REASONABLE FOR JUDGE ANDERSON TO HAVE BELIEVED THAT IT 
WAS KEPT AT THE RESIDENCE WHICH WAS SEARCHED, 3975 SOUTH 
VERNAL AVENUE. AND AS I INDICATED, IF I WERE TO REVIEW THE 
MATTER AND GIVE WEIGHT TO THE STATEMENT OF THE POLICE OFFICER 
WHICH WAS THAT HE TOLD JUDGE ANDERSON THAT MR. ROWLEY DIDN'T 
LIVE THERE, I THINK THAT I WOULD HAVE TO GIVE EVEN GREATER 




INFORMATION ISSUED THE WARRANT. BASED UPON THE RECORD, THE 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
NOW, I FEEL I HAVE RULED FROM THE BENCH. AND MAYBE 
I HAVEN'T GIVEN A GOOD ENOUGH RECORD FOR YOU. IS THERE 
ANYTHING THAI 1 SHOULD CONSIDER A I • , , - M . I- • T- «i 
I HAVE NOT THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO POINT THE COURT TO? MR. 
WALLENTINE? 
MR. WALLENTINE: NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: MR. BEASLIN? 
MR. BEASLIN: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: MR. WILLIAMS? 
MR. WILLIAMS: WELL, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE — WE NEED 
A SET OF FINDINGS, WRITTEN FINDINGS IN THIS MATTER, I BELIEVE. 
THE COURT: DO YOU REALLY THINK THAT I NEED TO MAKE 
FINDINGS OF FACT? 
MR. WILLIAMS: I BELIEVE WE NEED SOME WRITTEN 
FIK THIS ONE BECAUSE IT IS OF THE NATURE, IT 
IS OF A NATURE THAT WERE THIS EVER TO GET TO THE APPEALS COURT 
FEEL LIKE THE FIRST THING THEY WOULD DO IS TURN IT AROUND OR 
D IT BACK FOR WRITTEN FINDINGS. 
THE COURT: THE ONLY THING I THINK FINDINGS WOULD 
BE NECESSARY WOULD BE AS TO GOOD FAITH, AND YOU AS MUCH AS 
CONCEDED WHEN I .JESTION THAT THERE WAS NO 
INDICATION AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHICH YOU PLACED BEFORE 
THE COURT WHICH WOULD INDICATE THE OFFICER ACTED IN BAD FAi: 
58 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
IN PROCURRING THE WARRANT. 
MR. WILLIAMS: THAT'S NOT THE ONLY ISSUE THAT WAS 
PRESENTED TO THE COURT. 
THE COURT: WELL, OKAY. SO ON WHAT FACTUAL BASIS 
WOULD I BE LOOKING AT? I AM — ISN'T IT THE APPELATE COURT, 
SINCE I DID THIS WITHIN THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE DOCUMENT, ABLE 
TO READ THIS AS WELL AS I AM AND — 
MR. WILLIAMS: WELL, I THINK WHAT YOU HAVE SAID IS 
PROBABLY SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT. BUT I 
THINK WE OUGHT TO REDUCE IT TO WRITING, IS WHAT I AM SAYING. 
THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW WHAT I COULD DO OTHER THAN 
WHAT I HAVE DONE. WOULD YOU SUBMIT SOMETHING TO THE COURT IF 
YOU THINK THAT I SHOULD? 
MR. WILLIAMS: WELL, IF I WAS TOTALLY SURE OF — 
WHAT I WOULD WANT TO DO IS HAVE A TRANSCRIPT OF WHAT YOU JUST 
DID BEFORE I ATTEMPTED TO EVEN TRY IT. 
THE COURT: THAT'S FAIR. MR. WALLENTINE, YOU HAVE 
BEEN UP SEVERAL TIMES. 
MR. WALLENTINE: MY ONLY POINT WOULD BE THAT THE 
COURT OF APPEALS IS GOING TO DO EXACTLY ONE THING. THEY ARE 
GOING TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE DOCUMENT. IF YOU ARE NOT GOING TO 
RULE ON INFORMATION THAT'S NOT IN THE SEARCH WARRANT, THEY ARE 
GOING TO DO A ISSUE OF REVIEW ON WHAT THE WARRANT SAYS, WHAT 
THE TESTIMONY WAS ELICITED TODAY WITH RESPECT TO THE 




1 NO OBJECTION. 
2 I THE COURT: THE ONLY FINDING THAT I WOULD THINK 
WOULD BE NECESSARY IS THAT THE OFFICER TOLD THE MAGISTRATE 
THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL LIVED AT ANOTHER ADDRESS, ANOTHER PLACE. 
HE DIDN'T LIVE THERE. AND OTHER THAN THAT, I THINK I JUST 
REVIEWED THE FOUR CORNERS. AND I MADE CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS. 
/ ' THOSE CONCLUSIONS ARE SOMETHING THAT THK COURT CM'' APPEALS 
8 AND THE SUPREME COURT ARE NOT BOUND TO. AND IT DOESN'T SEEM 
9 TO BE AN ISSUE OF FACT WHETHER "OR NOT HE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH 
10 IN PROCURRING THE WARRANT. SO THAT WILL BE MY ORDER. 
11 AND, MR. WILLIAMS, IF YOU'LL SUBMIT, AFTER 
12 REVIEWING THE TRANSCRIPT, IF YOU THINK THAT IT'S NECESSARY FOR 
13 THE COURT TO MAKE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS, I'LL BE GLAD TO TAKE A 
14 LOOK AT THAT ALSO. AND I WILL IF IT'S APPROPRIATE. 
15 MR. WILLIAMS: AND AGAIN, IT'S NOT NECESSARILY 
16 ADDITIONAL, IT'S MERELY TO REFINE, BECAUSE IT WAS KIND OF A 
17 FREE-FLOW CONVERSATION. 
18 THE COURT: YES. I KNOW WHEN I RULE FROM THE BENCH 
19 IT'S NO^ PRECISE. A ^OLOGIZE FOR THAT. ANYTHING 
20 FURTHER? 
21 MR. WILLIAMS: NO. 

































I, RUSSEL D. MORGAN, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE 
FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED 
AT THE TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME 
WAS SUBSEQUENTLY BY ME CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN 
FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 3 THROUGH 60, INCLUSIVE; AND 
THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION 
OF TESTIMONY GIVEN. 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS 
7TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1995, AT VERNAL, UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
DECEMBER 22, 1998. 
RUSSEL O.MORGAN { 
490 East 1500 North I 
Vernal, Utah 84078 " 
My Commission Exptf* 12/22/58 | 
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